Variation in the Shortsightedness of European Climate Policy

Policymakers are increasingly confronted with problems like climate change that require thinking in the long term, yet they are often viewed as only being able to focus on the next elections. Despite this common assumption, research has shown that policymakers are at times able to take more long-term beneficial decisions. What can explain this variation?

The European Union (EU) has a long history of developing emission reduction objectives and broader climate legislation. It formulated its first comprehensive climate and energy package in 2008 that had a 20% emission reduction target by 2020 (compared to 1990 levels), followed by the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework in 2014-18 setting a 40% reduction objective by 2030, and the European Climate Law and the Fit for 55 Package as part of the European Green Deal in 2019-23 that aimed to reduce emissions by 55% by 2030.

While targets have become nominally stricter, this does not always mean they have become more ambitious or farsighted. Rather, research has shown that the level to which the EU exhibits short-term thinking – i.e., its shortsightedness – has varied. Moreover, even though the EU has formulated legislation in various economic sectors to support the achievement of its emission reduction targets, this sectoral climate legislation is not always aligned with the economy-wide targets. For example, the EU has adopted CO2 emission performance standards for cars that aim to reduce the car sector’s emissions since 2008. However, despite them becoming stricter, their inconsistency with the EU’s economy-wide emission objectives has increased. Only the 2035 phase-out date for fossil fuel cars, after which only electric vehicles will be able to be sold, can be seen as in line with EU objectives, in this case, climate neutrality by 2050. The inconsistency between the sectoral and economy-wide levels points to differences in shortsightedness between different EU policy areas.

Drivers of shortsightedness

Researchers have pointed to electoral systems and relations with interest groups to explain shortsightedness. Policymakers are seen to chase votes from the electorate in short-term electoral cycles, and economic actors represented in business groups are said to influence them to take more shortsighted decisions. However, if policymakers feel less at risk of electoral punishment, and if they have institutionalized relationships with interest groups based on trust, they might be able to take more farsighted decisions. Additionally, it is not a given that the electorate or interest groups are necessarily shortsighted. People generally care about having a good quality of life in the future, and groups such as environmental NGOs might also take up a more farsighted position.

So far, there has not been a lot of research studying how these dynamics might be present at the EU level. Surprisingly, the EU constitutes an interesting case to study shortsightedness due to its unique multi-level decision-making structure and its established role as a climate leader.

Within the EU, the European Commission first formulates a proposal on the basis of which the Council and the European Parliament have to reach an agreement. These three institutions are appointed in their own ways and have varying operating procedures that might influence the way these shortsightedness mechanisms have an impact on EU climate policymaking. For example, the different appointment procedures of the three institutions shape their relationship with the electorate. While the Council is directly elected in national elections, the Parliament is elected through European elections that are often viewed as “second-order”, and the Commission is indirectly appointed by the Member States and has to approved by the Parliament. As such, it can be expected that the Council will be more responsive to concerns from the electorate due to its close proximity to it, followed by the Parliament and the Commission. Additionally, the Council is seen to be the closest to national interest groups related to industry, the Commission to European business groups, and the Parliament to be the most open institution to environmental NGOs and civil society. Because of these differences in openness, the institutions might be responsive to different interest group concerns.

Varying degrees of responsiveness

The analysis of these shortsightedness mechanisms in the decision-making surrounding the 2030 Climate and Energy Framework, the European Climate Law and Fit for 55 Package, and the 2014, 2019 and 2023 Car CO2 Emission Reduction Regulations showed that the institutions indeed have varying levels of responsiveness to electoral and interest group concerns. The Council positions exhibited the strongest correlation with electoral concerns – not surprising giving their direct relationship with voters. However, recently, the Parliament also has exhibited more responsiveness to electoral concerns, potentially related to stronger fragmentation in the Parliament and increased visibility of climate legislation. Additionally, the analysis points to a correlation between
business group concerns and the Commission’s positions, and between national interests and Member States’ positions in the Council. This was less the case for the Parliament, which could be the result of its openness to all kinds of interest groups.

Voters and interest groups can be farsighted

In contrary to popular belief, the responsiveness to the electorate and interest groups did not necessarily imply shortsightedness. For instance, the climate youth protests of 2018-19 greatly increased public awareness of climate change and resulted in a more farsighted electorate. This led to the record election success of Green Parties in both national and European elections, which in its turn resulted in more farsighted positions in the institutions. Generally, the Council’s position fluctuated the most between, but also during, the examined EU legislative periods, showing how increased responsiveness can result in increased variation in shortsightedness.

Additionally, as carmakers have started to invest heavily in electric vehicles, they were also more favourable to stronger CO2 emission standards which could have aided the Commission in presenting its phase out date for the sale of fossil fuel cars starting in 2035. Nevertheless, Member States with large car manufacturing industries such as Germany and the Czech Republic continue to vocally oppose this de facto ban on fossil fuel cars as it could affect their domestic industries.

The future of EU climate policy?

To sum up, while pressures from the electorate and interest groups generally can result in more short-term thinking, this is not always the case. At times, it can even enable more farsighted policymaking, as we saw, for instance, in the case of the European Green Deal. This speaks to the importance of creating space for farsighted voices through supporting civil society and allowing activism.

Recent trends point however to the opposite happening in the EU. Climate activists increasingly face repression and prosecution, as climate movements are criminalized and classified as terrorist threats. Some argue that the farmer protests of 2024 that resulted in significant weakening of environmental protection measures were co-opted by agri-business groups like Copa-Cogeca that made use of their access to decision-makers to hollow out the agriculture part of the European Green Deal. Other farmers with less resources felt drowned out by the big lobby organisations, and frustrated by the outcome of the protests.

Moving forward, the EU should protect climate activists and their right to protest, and open up the decision-making of especially sectoral climate legislation to include a wide variety of actors beyond the traditional lobby organisations. Failing to do so greatly jeopardises the transition to climate neutrality, and the future of the European continent and beyond.

About the author

Dr Jana Gheuens is a Researcher at the Centre for Environment, Economy and Energy at the Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel. She investigates various aspects of EU climate governance as part of the 4I-TRACTION and GreenDeal-NET projects. Additionally, she co-teaches the course ‘EU Climate Policy’ in the Brussels School’s Postgraduate Certificate in EU Policy Making Programme. Jana also has her own podcast ‘How Green is Your Deal?’ in which she talks with climate experts about hot topics in EU climate governance.

Prior to her current position, Jana conducted research on the degree of shortsightedness of EU climate and energy policy during her PhD, and on water security and disaster risk reduction on small island developing states at the United Nations University – Institute for Water, Environment and Health.